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Introduction 
 
The genocide that occurred in Rwanda in 1994 was but another sad and violent 
chapter in the nation’s history. In order to understand why the genocide occurred, 
it is necessary to look at the events in Rwanda’s past. Rwanda’s pre-colonial 
history is greatly disputed, and different parties tend to hold differing views, but 
regardless of the view, it is no disputed fact that Rwanda has been plagued with 
ethnic divisions since its earliest days as a colony and later as an independent 
nation.  
The need for transitional justice and reconciliation in Rwanda becomes 
apparent in light of the genocide. In countries like Rwanda, where catastrophic 
human rights abuses have occurred, systems must be set up in order to redress the 
abuses that took place. In order for the nation to move forward in unity, it must be 
able to deal with its past. While means to deal with the genocide and implement 
the transitional justice necessary for the Rwandan people were developed at both 
the international and domestic level, due to shortcomings at both levels, another 
effort needed to be undertaken. In response, the Rwandan government proposed a 
modern adaptation of the traditional Gacaca tribunal. Traditional Rwandan 
Gacaca tribunals endeavored to uncover the truth and promote reconciliation 
between the offending party and the victim in communities where a wrong had 
been committed. However, problems with such a system under state control 
became evident as the trials progressed. The Rwandan government implemented 
the Gacaca courts to promote reconciliation and enact justice following the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. However, this approach worked only in theory. 
Reality has proven the Gacaca Courts to be inadequate in the enactment of long-
term reconciliation and nonpartisan justice. Through analyzing the circumstances 
leading up to the genocide and the implementation of the Gacaca court system to 
deal with the aftermath, this paper will examine the deep currents of ethnicity, 
violence, and division and how Rwanda’s system of transitional justice system 
failed to resolve these issues.  
 
 
The Road to Genocide 
 
The Rwandan genocide has often been misconstrued as a purely ethnic conflict. A 
look back upon the history of Rwanda and upon the events leading up to the 
genocide reveals a much more telling story.1 Controversy surrounds the nature of 
the pre-colonial Rwandan state of affairs, but two primary accounts exist with 
heavy followings. The first account — which is favored by the current Rwandan 
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 government — emphasizes the fact that Hutus and Tutsis dwelled together 
peacefully prior to colonization. This account holds that conflict along ethnic 
divisions did not occur until Rwanda’s years of colonization. Many who hold this 
view have also suggested that the Hutu-Tutsi division was not purely an ethnic 
division but rather reflected socioeconomic status. This idea suggests the 
possibility of mobility between identifying groups.2 Based upon this view, the 
Tutsi were historically portrayed as cattle-herders and Hutus as those with cattle 
herds fewer than ten or as agriculturalists.3  
The second account emphasizes that conflict existed along ethnic divisions 
prior to colonization. This account often cites the migratory history of the region 
with the Tutsis arriving last and imposing their rule over the Hutus.4 As opposed 
to the prior account, this account certainly suggests that a difference in ethnicity 
existed between the Hutus and Tutsis as they migrated from different regions at 
different times. Regardless of the pre-colonial account held as truth, most scholars 
agree that colonization had a great impact on dividing the Hutu and Tutsi people 
along ethnic divisions and played a great role in the ensuing conflict.5  
The Germans first colonized Rwanda in 1885, declaring their claim at the 
Conference of Berlin. However, following the end of World War I, Belgium 
gained control of Germany’s colonial holdings in Rwanda. With the Belgian 
colonization came a solidification of Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic identities. The 
Belgians implemented a system of identification cards and attempted to use 
scientific methods in order to differentiate the existing Hutu and Tutsi identities.6 
The Tutsi minority was seen as more fit to rule and the Hutu as more fit to be 
ruled over. Some scholars believe that this was a tradition dating back to the first 
days of colonization in which the Tutsi convinced many of the white settlers, 
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 known as the Bazungu, of their divine right to rule.7 Other scholars point to 
physical characteristics. The Tutsi were typically taller and had physical features, 
which looked more like the Bazungu colonists, thus creating a kinship and a 
favored view in the eyes of the colonists. Under colonial rule, the Tutsi minority 
enjoyed the benefits of rulership, whereas the Hutu often felt the weight of being 
subjected to a minority rule.8  
In 1959, the tables began to turn in favor of the Hutu. A movement known 
as the social revolution or Hutu revolution began to gain ground. Acknowledging 
the power of the Hutu majority and the precariousness of their situation, the 
Belgians began to throw their weight behind the Hutus.9 As a result, Tutsi leaders 
were thrown out of power, and violence against the former Tutsi leaders and their 
families became routine. Following the revolution, an independent Rwandan state 
was formed and Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, became the first president of 
Rwanda. The conflict between the two groups only grew as the Hutus sought 
revenge and began killing Tutsis.10 The Tutsis became limited in both their 
occupational and educational opportunities due to quotas imposed by the new 
Hutu government.11 Many Tutsis fled to surrounding countries but could not 
return after the violence subsided because of prohibitions from the Rwandan 
government.12 In response, young Tutsis in Uganda came together and formed the 
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF). While the Hutu-dominated regime proclaimed 
freedom from the oppression of minority rule, in reality this regime was just as 
minority ruled as the last. Instead of a Tutsi minority leading, the Hutu elite led 
the country, representing an oligarchy rather than a true democracy.13  
Following the end of the Cold War, the international community faced a 
heightened demand for democracy; Rwanda was not exempt from these 
demands.14 At this time, Rwanda had several political currents flowing within it. 
The elite in power wished to maintain their rule, the internal opposition pushed 
for democracy, and the external opposition associated primarily with the RPF 
sought power through armed opposition.15 In 1990, Rwanda faced the threat of 
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 civil war following an RPF attack from Uganda.16 After an unsuccessful offensive 
in 1990, the RPF reached Kigali, the Rwandan capital, in 1993.17 This offensive 
sparked peace talks between the Hutus and Tutsis. The Arusha Peace Agreement, 
signed in August 1993, consented to a multi-party system with a power sharing 
agreement between the different political movements as well as an integration of 
the rebel forces, primarily the RPF, into the national military.18 However, tensions 
were by no means dissolved. Instead, the Hutus began to make preparations for an 
escalation in ethnic violence. Extremist Hutus began to organize trained militias 
and produced propaganda painting the Tutsis in a highly negative manner.19 The 
assassination of President Habyarimana on April 6, 1994, instigated the ensuing 
conflict that would rise to a genocidal status and would be put to a stop only when 
the RPF again intervened.20 
The genocide was not purely an ethnic conflict. Instead, many scholars 
believe that ethnic divisions were exacerbated during the genocide and used in 
order to justify violence that masked deeper intents.21 Prior to the outbreak of civil 
war in 1990, Rwanda faced great economic strain as a series of disappointing 
harvest seasons led to a huge trade deficit. The current Hutu regime also faced 
great troubles as the international demands for greater democratization and attacks 
by the RPF threatened to overthrow political stability. The state sought to unite 
the Hutu majority in the face of such crises; the Tutsi minority became the perfect 
scapegoat.22 First, through propaganda the RPF and extremism became 
synonymous with every single Tutsi citizen.23 Suddenly each Tutsi was a threat to 
national security. Accordingly, the government blamed the economic crisis on a 
conspiracy by merchants and tradesmen — professions dominated by Tutsis.24 
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 The military preparations against the Tutsi by extremist Hutus now appeared 
justified in the eyes of the Hutu majority.25 The negative portrayal of the minority 
Tutsi united the Hutu masses under the power of the state. The extended power of 
the state would allow for a quick and efficient process of racial elimination.26 The 
genocide was not a senseless ethnic conflict, but rather a move by the state to 
monopolize its power amongst its people and maintain the status quo of Hutu 
majority rule. 
The Rwandan genocide came to an end in the summer of 1994 after 100 
days of brutal killing and the extermination of nearly one million Tutsis and 
sympathetic Hutus.27 The Rwandan government and the rest of the international 
community were left with the question of how those guilty of engaging in the 
genocide should be punished. The implementation of justice for the victims would 
be an integral part of rebuilding the post-conflict country.  
 
 
Transitional Justice on the International and Domestic Level 
 
States set new precedents for future generations with the ways in which they deal 
with past conflict. Justice must be served in order to prevent future episodes, but 
justice must be balanced with the needs of the victims. States must learn to 
balance law with concern for human rights; this is imperative for states, like 
Rwanda, with a history of human rights abuses. Although this event occurred in 
the past, the nation still feels the effects of the conflict.28  
The United Nations Security Council established the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the fall of 1994 following the end of the 
genocide. The goal of the tribunal was to try those guilty of crimes of genocide 
and other acts that violate international law.29 The tribunal has sought to ensure 
that violations of the most basic human rights do not go overlooked.30 While the 
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 aim of the tribunal is noble indeed, it has not effectively connected itself to the 
Rwandan people. Many Rwandans look upon the tribunal with doubts and 
disinterest. They view the tribunal as being distant from them both by proximity 
— as it is located in Arusha, Tanzania — and by the Western justice that it 
promotes rather than the reconciliation that the Rwandans desire.31 The Rwandan 
public is also not widely informed as to the nature and purpose of the ICTR, 
leaving them ignorant of and indifferent to its efforts.32 
Politics also play a great role in the execution of justice within the ICTR. 
Because the tribunal is located outside of Rwanda, the tribunal relies upon the 
cooperation of the Rwandan government in matters concerning both the witnesses 
and the accused. Unfortunately, this has led to one of the tribunal’s greatest 
criticisms. Many critics of the tribunal, especially Hutu critics, point to the 
tribunal’s failure to try crimes committed by the RPF throughout the course of the 
Rwandan conflict. Many innocent civilians fell at the hand of the RPF both before 
and after the genocide broke out.33 Prosecution of the RPF is not outside the 
bounds of the jurisdiction of the ICTR.34 Rather, the ICTR has not proceeded with 
the prosecution of RPF crimes due to the nature of its relationship with the 
Rwandan government. An exploration into the matters of the RPF — of which the 
current Rwandan president was a member — has led to an end in cooperation in 
the past. By means of necessity, the ICTR needs to keep the channels of 
cooperation open between itself and the Rwandan government and thus cannot 
explore the crimes of the RPF.35 Other criticisms of the ICTR include its failure to 
send down sentences expeditiously as well as the failure of the ICTR to rule on 
sexual crimes committed during the genocide.36  
While the ICTR has not brought about the reconciliation that Rwandans 
desire, the capacity of the Rwandan national judicial system to deal with the 
deluge of criminals and cases related to the genocide has been entirely lacking in 
this area as well. Detainees are kept in crowded prisons, and often due process 
rights are overlooked. Many Hutus view this faulty system of justice as the Tutsi 
version of victor’s justice.37 Truth is an integral part of the reconciliation process. 
Truth allows for dialogue to occur and for recompense to be made. Often a 
country’s pursuit of justice can obscure the lines of truth and overlook the needs 
of the victimized. The Rwandan government has been so consumed with the 
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 duties of implementing justice that reconciliation has often been looked upon as a 
secondary goal.38  
Outside groups have made recommendations for an independent 
commission whose sole focus would be in regards to reconciliation, but when 
criminal proceedings began, the Rwandan government simply did not have the 
ability to make this a feasible option. If a reconciliation commission were to be 
put in place, it would need to be recognized by the Rwandan people as a 
legitimate source of authority. Its primary goal should be to pursue the truth and 
promote healing for victims. Each victim’s story is important and needs to be 
heard in order for the healing process to begin. However, if the pursuit of truth is 
done in the wrong way, it can reopen wounds and cause more harm than good. In 
order for the country to move on as a unified nation, the government of Rwanda 
must find a means of reconciliation that can be successful. The remnants of the 
ethnic conflict not only affect the political structure of the country, but also the 
economic structure and activities.39  
 
 
The Gacaca Court System 
 
One way in which the government of Rwanda sought to promote reconciliation 
and pursue truth alongside justice was through its implementation of the Gacaca 
court system. In traditional Gacaca, elderly men of the community comprised the 
judge’s panel with the impartial implementation of justice as the goal.40 The scope 
of the court dealt with property feuds and any other domestic dispute plaguing the 
community. A large part of traditional Gacaca rested in reconciliation and the 
restoration of balance back in the community—including the reintegration of the 
perpetrator into community life.41 
The primary goals of the modern Gacaca system included the acceleration 
of prosecutions, the punishment of the guilty, freedom for the victims, the 
establishment of the truth as well as reconciliation between the Hutus and 
Tutsis.42 The modern Gacaca system, under the power of the state, was a highly 
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 politicized system broken into several different levels and phases designed to 
alleviate the strain on the national court and prison system.43 The Gacaca system 
proposed by the government encapsulated a pyramid-like structure with the 
Rwandan Supreme Court at the top. The levels of the Gacaca courts included cell, 
sector, and appeals; each progressing level dealt with crimes in a higher 
categorization than the previous level.44 The Gacaca tribunals tried crimes that 
were placed in three categories. The first category included those who had 
planned the genocide, torturers, rapists, known murderers, and those who 
committed dehumanizing acts on dead bodies. The second category included 
those who had committed murder or committed acts with the intent of killing their 
victim and those who committed violent acts without the intent to kill. The third 
category was limited to those who committed property offenses. The first phase of 
Gacaca included an information-gathering session in each of the communities 
affected by the genocide. These sessions documented those affected by the 
genocide, the testimonies of witnesses, and those accused of crimes. Following 
the information-gathering sessions, the crimes of the accused were then placed 
into the categorization system designed by the government; this determined at 
what level the accused would be tried. Finally, the trials began in the communities 
affected by the genocide. After hearing the testimonies of the witnesses, the 
judges would meet together and determine the verdict against the accused.45  
The Gacaca tribunal system prosecuted crimes — those categorized as 
genocidal crimes or crimes against humanity — committed between October 1, 
1990, and December 31, 1994.46 The presiding judges of the tribunals were 
elected by the community and went through a few days of training before 
assuming their posts; prior legal experience or training was not a prerequisite to 
being elected as a judge.47 Throughout the entire trial process, the community was 
encouraged to speak out and participate in order to best flush out the truth of the 
events that had occurred during the prior period of unrest and violence.48 
Eventually, participation became mandatory, and those who refused to attend the 
trials could face fines.49 The Gacaca courts aimed at reconciliation and often gave 
lesser sentences to perpetrators who accepted the responsibility of their actions 
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 and made efforts to seek forgiveness from their victims.50 Convictions also 
required no physical evidence and relied solely on witness testimony.51 
Punishments ranged anywhere from community service to life in prison. Only the 
official state courts could hand down death sentences until Rwanda abolished the 
death penalty in 2007.52  
 
 
The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Gacaca Court System 
 
Controversy has surrounded the Gacaca courts. Many Rwandans believe in the 
rehabilitating power of the courts and the type of justice that is served there. 
However, many others — Rwandans and non-Rwandans alike — have found 
many flaws inherent in the Gacaca system, which debilitate its implementation of 
both reconciliation and justice nationwide. 
The Gacaca court system has many strengths, and proponents of the 
system point to these strengths as fulfillment of the system’s purpose. First of all, 
the Gacaca court system has encouraged greater transparency of proceedings with 
the public as witness. Hidden grievances and resentments have been brought to 
the surface in order to be approached in such a way that promotes truth and 
dialogue between victims and perpetrators. Dialogue promotes understanding and 
acts as a useful tool for educating the next generation in order to avoid another 
violent tragedy.53 Individuals are also able to gain the truth about the 
circumstances surrounding their loved ones’ deaths.54 In addition, perpetrators 
have been reintegrated into society through dialogue with the victims and the 
community service often required of them.55 More so than the ICTR, the Gacaca 
court system has had greater success in connecting the Rwandan people with the 
justice that it hands down as well as integrating them into the means by which 
justice comes about. As a result, the Rwandan people much prefer the Gacaca 
system to the ICTR or even the national court system.56 The Gacaca system also 
provides an economic benefit to the Rwandan nation. The high number of 
incarcerated prisoners awaiting trial in national prisons serves as an economic 
drain on the country. The Gacaca courts are able to try cases at a greater speed 
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 than the international and national court systems. By speeding up the backlog of 
cases, the Gacaca system reduces this strain on the country’s economy.57  
Along with the strengths of the Gacaca system come weaknesses that 
appear to be inherent in the system. The traditional Rwandan concept of justice 
comes from the word utabera — a word that portrays an idea of social 
reconstruction.58 The Gacaca system in many Rwandan eyes has not lived up to 
this traditional concept of restoring the social balance but rather has sought to 
administer retributive justice. Many have come to see the Gacaca as an 
opportunity to exact revenge on enemies or to intimidate others with the threat of 
accusation.59 Instead of instilling a sense of truth and reconciliation, the Gacaca 
has stirred up feelings of fear and intimidation.  
Elements of the Gacaca system reveal a deeply rooted sense of 
governmental control in the Gacaca proceedings that undermines restorative 
efforts within the communities. Participation in Gacaca became mandatory — 
punishable by fines — shortly after its conception, revealing the coercion of 
reluctant citizens into something that the government deemed necessary.60 
Additionally, the community service prescribed to convicted perpetrators often is 
not done within the community where the crime was committed but rather done in 
the form of public service projects. This portrays the idea that officials may be 
using the system in order to benefit government efforts rather than the 
communities affected by the genocide.61 Another area of state control within 
Gacaca proceedings has been revealed through the charges brought up against 
critics of the post-genocide regime. Many believe that the Gacaca system has 
become an avenue for the government to eliminate those who speak up against the 
current regime.62 
The process by which judges were selected to serve on the judging panel 
has also opened an avenue of complaint for critics of the system. Legal experience 
and knowledge of the legal system were not prerequisites to becoming a judge. 
Instead, the populace elected the judges based upon reputation.63 The judges are 
critical to the success of the Gacaca system and the faulty discernment of just one 
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 judge can compromise the entire system.64 Unfortunately, some judges 
themselves have been convicted of genocidal crimes.65 Additionally, judges 
receive little or no compensation for their work and have a greater propensity for 
accepting bribes, thus undermining the authority of the Gacaca proceedings.66 
Many Western critics also point to the lack of due process rights for the accused 
as an argument against Gacaca.67 Defendants have no legal counsel, and 
convictions are not based upon physical evidence, but rather upon the testimony 
of witnesses. Because of the lack of accountability, participants in Gacaca are able 
to bear false witness against the accused.68 In order to receive lesser sentences, the 
accused often wrongfully confess to crimes they did not commit in order to avoid 
the risk of being convicted for a crime that demands a harsher sentence. This 
undermines the pursuit and discovery of truth within the Gacaca proceedings.69 In 
addition, because the proceedings take place in many rural communities, the 
accused can flee prosecution with ease — escaping the justice their actions 
demand.70  
A major Hutu criticism of the Gacaca system rests in the fact that only 
genocidal crimes have been addressed, leaving out the crimes committed by the 
RPF against the Hutus both before and after the genocide.71 Unfortunately, this 
leads many Hutus to view the form of justice handed down by the Gacaca as one-
sided and an example of victor’s justice.72 Because the Hutus still have grievances 
weighing upon them, true reconciliation is not possible. Until the uninhibited 
dialogue of all crimes committed is possible, many Hutu will hold onto their 
resentments, thus impeding the ability of the Rwandan nation to move past its 
violent history. The Gacaca system has also been viewed as reinforcing ethnic 
divisions rather than reconciling them. Because almost an entire generation of 
Hutu men has been associated with the crimes of the genocide, an idea of the 
collective guilt of all Hutus is perpetuated rather than individuating guilt based 
upon individual actions. Had the Tutsi crimes against the Hutu been a 
consideration in the Gacaca proceedings alongside the crimes committed during 
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 the actual genocide, this idea would most likely not have been perpetuated, 
making true reconciliation a more obtainable goal.73  
Another weakness of the Gacaca system also lies in the possible safety 
issues and psychological side effects associated with witnessing in a Gacaca trial. 
Unfortunately, many witnesses have been barred from telling their story because 
of intimidation or coercion from the perpetrator’s family or simply because they 
felt their physical safety would be jeopardized by witnessing in a trial.74 A series 
of interviews done by Karen Brouneus at a widow’s association in Kigali provides 
a more in-depth analysis of both the issues of personal safety and psychological 
side effects suffered by witnesses in the Gacaca trials. She interviewed sixteen 
women ranging from ages 27 to 67.75 The interviews revealed that each woman 
began to be harassed and threatened after giving testimony at a Gacaca trial. One 
woman described how not only her physical safety was threatened but also her 
livelihood. Her harassers brought their cows onto her land to graze and 
subsequently destroyed her crops. During the trials, many of the witnesses are 
harassed verbally by the shouts and contributions of those in attendance. One 
woman revealed that she now longer attends Gacaca because her sister was killed 
after testifying at a trial. The women also revealed the psychological side effects 
associated with testifying through their interviews. Many described the horror of 
reliving their experiences as they testified in court. Many of the women suffered 
physical trauma such as uncontrollable shaking, crying, and fainting while on the 
witness stand. The women are left vulnerable as a result of their testifying, and 
many women confessed to feeling lonely and isolated from the rest of their 
community.76 Sadly, these women who should feel comforted and relieved as 
their testimonies help to enact justice in the community instead are left feeling 
lonely, isolated, and fearful.  
 
 
A Practical Perspective 
 
Through all the praises and criticisms of the Gacaca court system, the opinion that 
matters most is that of the Rwandan people. Polls taken early in the 2000s 
presented a rather positive outlook on the Gacaca system from the Rwandan 
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 population; however, it is imperative to look at more recent opinions.77 Jacqueline 
Lewis, an undergraduate researcher with the University of New Hampshire, did 
precisely that in a study undertaken at the National University of Rwanda. 
Only a small percentage of the Rwandan population pursues higher 
education. Thus, the current university students are the future of leadership within 
their country. Lewis interviewed thirty-two students at the National University of 
Rwanda in order to gain insight into this young generation’s thoughts about the 
form of justice carried out in the Gacaca courts as well as the future of the 
conflict-ridden country. Through a process of asking pointed questions, Lewis 
was able to determine that approximately twenty of the students students were 
Tutsi and nine were Hutu, leaving three students unidentified in regard to 
ethnicity.78  
Overall, both the Hutu and Tutsi students had similar views on the Gacaca 
courts. When asked about the general characteristics of the Gacaca courts in 
relation to effectiveness, the responses were positive and hopeful. Many of the 
students wholeheartedly believed in the mission of the Gacaca courts. However, 
when asked more specific and pointed questions about the effectiveness of the 
courts, the students began to waver in the confidence they had previously shown 
in the courts. A few students talked about the room for corruption within the 
Gacaca court systems. Others mentioned that the perpetrators’ families often 
suffered the most. Ultimately, the students agreed with the goals of the Gacaca 
court, but saw a disparity between the goal and what actually came about as a 
result of Gacaca.79  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Rwandan people have been plagued by a history of ethnic division and 
violence playing upon them. Regardless of the directly precipitating causes and 
circumstances leading up to the genocide, the situation was most certainly 
exacerbated by the pre-existing ethnic definitions of Hutu and Tutsi. The crimes 
committed during the Rwandan genocide demand justice, but there is also a 
strong need for reconciliation within the conflict-ridden country. If the country is 
to move on and leave its violent past behind, it must move on as a country of 
unified people. The Gacaca court system seeks to promote both justice and 
reconciliation, but it is by no means a perfect system as it lends itself to the 
possibility of corruption, further suffering endured by the victims, and partisan 
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 justice. Nor does the Gacaca system uphold the message of truth and 
reconciliation that it claims to pursue.  
The many shortcomings of the Gacaca system have managed to maintain 
the ethnic divide between Hutus and Tutsis rather than eradicating it. The current 
generation shows a strong desire to move on from the past and embrace a unified 
Rwanda, but a country that has endured divisive civil war cannot simply receive a 
taste of the antidote and then be completely cured. While the Gacaca courts and 
the criminal proceedings that took place in Rwanda were a step in the right 
direction, these efforts simply were not enough to erase the stain of the genocide 
in Rwanda. The truth brought forth by the Gacaca trials is one that reflects only 
half of the story and was cultivated in an environment of fear and government 
intervention. In order for true reconciliation to begin, the dialogue that began 
during the process of Gacaca must continue under a supervisor independent from 
the government. People must be able to express themselves without fearing the 
repercussions of their story. An objective truth about the pre-genocide and 
genocide occurrences must be made public knowledge in order for Rwanda to 
move on.  
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